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Abstract
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and
finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function
which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real
number. We prove that if the the payoff function is both shift-invariant
and submixing, then the game is half-positional, i.e. the first player has an
optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary. This result
relies on the existence of ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies in shift-invariant
games, a second contribution of the paper.
1 Introduction.
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finitely many states S and actions
A, perfect information and infinite duration. Each state is controlled by either
Player 1 or Player 2. A play of the game is an infinite sequence of steps: at
each step the game is in some state s ∈ S and the player who controls this state
chooses an action, which determines a lottery that is used to randomly choose
the next state. Players have full knowledge about the rules of the game (the
states and actions sets, who controls which state and the lotteries associated
to pairs of states and actions) and when they choose an action they have full
knowledge of the actions played and the states visited so far.
Each player wants to maximize his expected payoff, and the game is zero-
sum. The payoff of Player 1 (which is exactly the loss of Player 2) associated
with an infinite play s0a1s1 · · · ∈ (SA)ω is computed by a measurable and
bounded payoff function f : (SA)ω → R.
∗This work was supported by the ANR projet ”Stoch-MC” and the LaBEX ”CPU”.
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Well-known examples of payoff functions are the discounted payoff function,
the mean-payoff function, the limsup payoff function and the parity payoff func-
tion. These four classes of games share a common property: in these games both
players have optimal strategies and moreover these strategies can be chosen to
be both deterministic and stationary: such strategies guarantee a maximal ex-
pected payoff and choose actions deterministically and this deterministic choice
only depends on the current state.
When deterministic and stationary optimal strategies exist for Player 1 in
any game equipped with f , we say f is half-positional, and we say f is positional
if such strategies exist for both players.
There has been numerous papers about the existence of deterministic and
stationary optimal strategies in games with different payoff functions. Shapley
proved that stochastic games with discounted payoff function are positional
using an operator approach [Sha53]. Derman showed the positionality of one-
player games with expected mean-payoff reward, using an Abelian theorem and
a reduction to discounted games [Der62]. Gilette extended Derman’s result to
two-player games [Gil57] but his proof was found to be wrong and corrected
by Ligget and Lippman [LL69]. The positionality of one-player parity games
was addressed in [CY90] and later on extended to two-player games in [CJH03,
Zie04]. Counter games were extensively studied in [BBE10] and several examples
of positional counter games are given. There are also several examples of one-
player and two-player positional games in [Gim07, Zie10]. A whole zoology of
half-positional games is presented in [Kop09] and another example is given by
mean-payoff co-Bu¨chi games [CHJ05]. The proofs of these various results are
mostly ad-hoc and very heterogeneous.
Some research has been made to find a common property of these games
which explains why they are positional or half-positional. It appears that shift-
invariant and submixing payoff functions play a central role. In a nutshell, a
payoff is shift-invariant if changing a finite-prefix of a play does not change
the payoff of the play and it is submixing if the payoff associated to the shuffle
of two plays cannot be greater than both payoffs of both shuffled plays, see
Definitions 3.2 and 5.1.
For one-player games it was proved by the first author that every one-player
game equipped with such a payoff function is positional [Gim07]. This result was
successfully used in [BBE10] to prove positionality of counter games. A weaker
form of this condition was presented in [GZ04] to prove positionality of deter-
ministic games (i.e. games where transition probabilities are equal to 0 or 1).
Kopczynski proved that two-player deterministic games equipped with a shift-
invariant and submixing which takes only two values is half-positional [Kop06].
A recent result [Zie10] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
positionality of one-player games. The condition is expressed in terms of the
existence of particular optimal strategies in multi-armed bandit games. When
trying to prove the positionality of a particular payoff function, the condition
in [Zie10] is much harder to check than the submixing property which is purely
syntactic.
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The present paper provides two contributions.
First, in games whose payoff function is shift-invariant, both players have ǫ-
subgame-perfect strategies, i.e. strategies that are ǫ-optimal not only when the
game starts but also whatever finite play has already been played (Theorem 4.1).
Second, every two-player game equipped with a shift-invariant and submix-
ing payoff function is half-positional, i.e. Player 1 has an optimal strategy which
is both deterministic and stationary (Theorem 5.2).
In parallel to our work, the first result was obtained very recently in [MY15,
Proposition 11], for a larger class of games and equilibria.
The paper starts with preliminaries, then in Section 3 we provide several
examples of payoff functions. In Section 4 we state and prove the existence
of ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies in shift-invariant games, in Section 5 we state
and prove that games with shift-invariant and submixing payoff functions are
half-positional, in Section 6 we present some applications.
2 Stochastic games with perfect information.
In this section, we present the notion of stochastic games with perfect infor-
mation, of the value and determinacy of such games, as well as several results
about martingales that are used in the next section.
2.1 Games
A game is specified by the arena and the payoff function. While the arena
determines how the game is played, the payoff function specifies what for the
players play.
We use the following notations throughout the paper. Let S be a finite set.
The set of finite (resp. infinite) sequences on S is denoted S∗ (resp. Sω) and
S∞ = S∗ ∪ Sω.
A probability distribution on S is a function δ : S→ R such that ∀s ∈ S, 0 ≤
δ(s) ≤ 1 and
∑
s∈S δ(s) = 1. The set of probability distributions on S is denoted
∆(S).
Definition 2.1 (Arenas). A stochastic arena with perfect information A =
(S,S1,S2,A, (A(s))s∈S, p) is made of:
• a set of states S partitioned in two sets (S1,S2),
• a set of actions A,
• for each state s ∈ S, a non-empty set A(s) ⊆ A of actions available in s,
• and transition probabilities p : S×A→ ∆(S) .
In the sequel, stochastic arenas with perfect information are simply called
arenas and we only consider arenas with finitely many states and actions.
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An infinite play in an arena A is an infinite sequence p = s0a1s1a2 · · · ∈
(SA)ω such that for every n ∈ N, an+1 ∈ A(sn). A finite play in A is a finite
sequence in S(AS)∗ which is the prefix of an infinite play. The first state of a
play is called its source, the last state of a finite play is called its target.
With each infinite play is associated a payoff computed by a payoff function.
Player 1 prefers strategies that maximize the expected payoff while Player 2 has
the exact opposite preference.
Formally, a payoff function for the arenaA is a bounded and Borel-measurable
function f : (SA)ω → R which associates with each infinite play h a payoff f(h).
In the next section, we will present several examples of such functions.
Definition 2.2 (Stochastic game with perfect information). A stochastic game
with perfect information is a pair G = (A, f) where A is an arena and f a
payoff function for the arena A.
2.2 Strategies
A strategy in an arena A for Player 1 is a function σ : (SA)∗S1 → ∆(A) such
that for any finite play s0a1 · · · sn, and every action a ∈ A, (σ(s0a1 · · · sn)(a) >
0) =⇒ (a ∈ A(sn)). Strategies for Player 2 are defined similarly and are
typically denoted τ .
We are especially interested in a very simple class of strategies: deterministic
and stationary strategies.
Definition 2.3 (Deterministic and stationary strategies). A strategy σ for
Player 1 is deterministic if for every finite play h ∈ (SA)∗S1 and action a ∈ A,
(σ(h)(a) > 0) ⇐⇒ (σ(h)(a) = 1) .
A strategy σ is stationary if σ(h) only depends on the target of h. In other
words σ is stationary if for every state t ∈ S1 and for every finite play h with
target t,
σ(h) = σ(t) .
In the definition of a stationary strategy, remark that t ∈ S denotes at the
same time the target of the finite play h as well as the finite play t of length 1.
Given an initial state s ∈ S and strategies σ and τ for players 1 and 2
respectively, the set of infinite plays with source s is naturally equipped with a
sigma-field and a probability measure denoted Pσ,τs that are defined as follows.
Given a finite play h and an action a, the set of infinite plays h(AS)ω and
ha(SA)ω are cylinders that we abusively denote h and ha. The sigma-field is
the one generated by cylinders and Pσ,τs is the unique probability measure on
the set of infinite plays with source s such that for every finite play h with target
t, for every action a ∈ A and state r ∈ S,
P
σ,τ
s (ha | h) =
{
σ(h)(a) if t ∈ S1,
τ(h)(a) if t ∈ S2,
(1)
P
σ,τ
s (har | ha) = p(r|t, a) . (2)
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For n ∈ N, we denote Sn andAn the random variables defined by Sn(s0a1s1 · · · ) =
sn and An(s0a1s1 · · · ) = an.
2.3 Values and optimal strategies
Let G be a game with a bounded measurable payoff function f : (SA)ω → R.
The expected payoff associated with an initial state s and two strategies σ and
τ is the expected value of f under Pσ,τs , denoted E
σ,τ
s [f ].
The maxmin and minmax values of a state s ∈ S in the game G are:
maxmin(G)(s) = sup
σ
inf
τ
E
σ,τ
s [f ] ,
minmax(G)(s) = inf
τ
sup
σ
E
σ,τ
s [f ] .
By definition of maxmin and minmax, for every state s ∈ S, maxmin(G)(s) ≤
minmax(G)(s). As a corollary of the Martin’s second determinacy theorem [Mar98],
the converse inequality holds as well:
Theorem 2.4 (Martin’s second determinacy theorem). Let G be a game with
a Borel-measurable and bounded payoff function f . Then for every state s ∈ S:
maxmin(G)(s) = minmax(G)(s) .
This common value is called the value of state s in the game G and denoted
val(G)(s).
The existence of a value guarantees the existence of ǫ-optimal strategies for
both players and every ǫ > 0.
Definition 2.5 (optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies). Let G be a game, ǫ > 0 and
σ a strategy for Player 1. Then σ is ǫ-optimal if for every strategy τ and every
state s ∈ S,
E
σ,τ
s [f ] ≥ minmax(G)(s) − ǫ .
The definition for Player 2 is symmetric. A 0-optimal strategy is simply called
optimal.
The following proposition provides a link between the notion of optimal
strategies and the notion of value.
Proposition 2.6. Let G be a game and suppose that Player 1 has an optimal
strategy σ♯. Then G has a value and for every state s ∈ S:
val(G)(s) = inf
τ
E
σ♯,τ
s [f ] . (3)
Proof. By definition of the maxmin, maxmin(G)(s) ≥ infτ Eσ
♯,τ
s [f ] and by defi-
nition of an optimal strategy, infτ E
σ♯,τ
s [f ] ≥ minmax(G)(s). As a consequence,
maxmin(s) ≥ minmax(s) thus s has a value and (3) holds.
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An even stronger class of ǫ-optimal strategies are ǫ-subgame-perfect strate-
gies, i.e. strategies that are not only ǫ-optimal from the initial state s but stays
also ǫ-optimal whatever the beginning of the play is.
Given a finite play h = s0 · · · sn and a function g whose domain is the set of
infinite plays, or the set of finite plays, by g[h] we denote the function g shifted
by h:
g[h](t0a1t1 · · · ) =
{
g(ha1t1 · · · ) if sn = t0,
g(t0a1t1 · · · ) otherwise.
Definition 2.7 (ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies). Let G be a game equipped with
a payoff function f . A strategy for Player 1, σ is said to be ǫ-subgame-perfect
if for every finite play h = s0 · · · sn
inf
τ
E
σ[h],τ
sn
[
f [h]
]
≥ val(G)(sn)− ǫ
2.4 Martingales
In Section 4 we observe that the stochastic process, val(G)(S0), val(G)(S1), . . .
is a martingale when both players choose only “value-preserving” actions, and
make use of the following basic result about martingales.
Proposition 2.8. Let T be a stopping time with respect to a sequence of random
variables S0, S1, . . . . Let (Xn)n∈N be a martingale such that for every n ∈ N,
Xn is (S0, . . . , Sn)-measurable. Assume there exists K > 0 such that ∀n ∈
N,P(|Xn| ≤ K) = 1. Let XT be the random variable defined by:
XT =
{
Xn if T is finite equal to n,
limn∈NXn if T =∞.
Then:
E[XT ] = E[X0] .
Similarly if the process is a supermartingale or a submartingale, and the same
conditions hold we have E[XT ] ≤ E[X0] and E[XT ] ≥ E[X0] respectively.
Proof. According to Doob’s convergence theorem for martingales, XT is well-
defined. For every k ∈ N let Yk = Xmin(T,k). The stopped process (Yk)k∈N is
also a martingale, a basic property of martingales. Since (Xn)n∈N is bounded by
K, (Yn)n∈N also is, and according to Doob’s theorem it converges almost-surely.
By definition of XT the limit of (Yn)n∈N is XT . By definition of martingales,
for every n ∈ N,E[Yn] = E[Y0] = E[X0] thus according to Lebesgue dominated
convergence theorem E[XT ] = E[X0]. A similar proof applies for the case of
supermartingales or submartingales.
3 Computing payoffs
In this section, we present several examples of payoff functions and generalize
the definition of a payoff function to cover these examples.
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3.1 Examples
Among the most well-known examples of payoff functions, are the mean-payoff
and the discounted payoff functions, used in economics, as well as the parity
condition, used in logics and computer science, and the limsup payoff function,
used in game theory.
Themean-payoff function has been introduced by Gilette [Gil57]. Intuitively,
it measures average performances. Each state s ∈ S is labeled with an immediate
reward r(s) ∈ R. With an infinite play s0a1s1 · · · is associated an infinite
sequence of rewards r0 = r(s0), r1 = r(s1), . . . and the payoff is:
fmean(r0r1 · · · ) = lim sup
n
1
n+ 1
n∑
i=0
ri . (4)
The discounted payoff has been introduced by Shapley [Sha53]. Intuitively,
it measures long-term performances with an inflation rate: immediate rewards
are discounted. Each state s is labeled not only with an immediate reward
r(s) ∈ R but also with a discount factor 0 ≤ λ(s) < 1. With an infinite play h
labeled with the sequence (r0, λ0)(r1, λ1) · · · ∈ (R× [0, 1[)ω of daily payoffs and
discount factors is associated the payoff:
fdisc((r0, λ0)(r1, λ1) · · · ) = r0 + λ0r1 + λ0λ1r2 + · · · . (5)
The parity condition is used in automata theory and logics [GTW02]. Each
state s is labeled with some priority c(s) ∈ {0, . . . , d}. The payoff is 1 if the
highest priority seen infinitely often is odd, and 0 otherwise. For c0c1 · · · ∈
{0, . . . , d}ω,
fpar(c0c1 · · · ) =
{
0 if lim supn cn is even,
1 otherwise.
(6)
The limsup payoff function has been used in the theory of gambling games [MS96].
States are labeled with immediate rewards and the payoff is the supremum limit
of the rewards: flsup(r0r1 · · · ) = lim supn rn.
One-counter stochastic games have been introduced in [BBE10], in these
games each state s ∈ S is labeled by a relative integer from c(s) ∈ Z. Three
different winning conditions were defined and studied in [BBE10]:
lim sup
n
∑
0≤i≤n
ci = +∞ (7)
lim sup
n
∑
0≤i≤n
ci = −∞ (8)
fmean(c0c1 . . .) > 0 (9)
Generalized mean payoff games were introduced in [CDHR10]. Each state
is labeled by a fixed number of immediate rewards
(
r(1), . . . , r(k)
)
, which define
as many mean payoff conditions
(
f1mean, . . . , f
k
mean
)
. The winning condition is:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k, f imean
(
r
(i)
0 r
(i)
1 . . .
)
> 0 . (10)
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3.2 Payoff functions
In the four examples above, the way payoffs are computed is actually indepen-
dent from the arena which is considered. To be able to consider a payoff function
independently of the arenas equipped with this payoff function, we generalize
the definition of payoff functions.
Definition 3.1 (Payoff functions). A payoff function is a bounded and measur-
able function f : Cω → R where C is a finite set called the set of colours. We say
a game G = (A, g) is equipped with f if there exists a mapping r : S×A→ C
such that for every infinite play s0a1s1a2 · · · in the arena A,
g(s0, a1, s1, a2, . . .) = f(r(s0, a1), r(s1, a2), . . .) .
In the case of the mean payoff and the limsup payoff functions, colours are
real numbers andC ⊆ R, whereas in the case of the discounted payoff colours are
pairs C ⊆ R× [0, 1[ and for the parity game colours are integers C = {0, . . . , d}.
Throughout this paper, we focus on shift-invariant payoff functions.
Definition 3.2 (Shift-invariant). A payoff function f : Cω → R is said to be a
shift-invariant payoff function if:
∀c ∈ C, ∀u ∈ Cω, f(cu) = f(u) . (11)
Note that shift-invariance is a strictly stronger property than tail-measurability.
Tail-measurability means that for every n ∈ N, the value of f(c0c1 · · · ) is inde-
pendent of the coordinates c0, . . . , cn. For example the function
f(c0c1 · · · ) =
{
1 if ∃n ∈ N, ∀k, k′ ≥ n, c2∗k = c2∗k′
0 otherwise,
is tail-measurable but not shift-invariant [Zie11]. It seems to the authors of the
present paper that the results of [Cha07] hold for shift-invariant winning objec-
tives but no proof is given under the weaker assumption of tail-measurability.
Actually, tail-measurability and shift-invariance are presented as equivalent in
the preliminaries ( [Cha07, l. 28 p. 184]) and the shift-invariance hypothesis is
used in the core of the proof ( [Cha07, l. -1 p.190]).
4 On the existence of ǫ-subgame-perfect strate-
gies
The following theorem is one of the two contributions of the paper, and is a
cornerstone for the result of the next section.
In parallel to our work, this result was obtained very recently in [MY15,
Proposition 11], for a larger class of games and equilibria.
Theorem 4.1. Let G be a game equipped with a payoff function f and ǫ > 0.
Assume f is shift-invariant. Then both players have ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies
in G.
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The remainder of this section is devoted to proving this theorem. The proof
is done from the point of view of Player 1, but it holds symmetrically for Player 2.
In order to avoid heavy notations in the proof of Theorem 4.1 we fix an
arbitrary ǫ > 0 for the entire Section 4 with the intention of proving the existence
of 2ǫ-subgame perfect strategies.
We fix for the rest of the section a game G equipped with a shift-invariant
payoff function f .
Section 4.1 introduces the central notion of weaknesses. In Section 4.2 we
define a reset strategy which detects the weaknesses and responds to them by
resetting the memory. Then the idea is to show that when the reset strategy is
used there will be only finitely many weaknesses and hence only finitely many
resets, almost surely. This is done in Section 4.4. But before this, in Section 4.3
we demonstrate that for all ǫ > 0 there are ǫ-optimal strategies which play only
value-preserving actions. And at last in Section 4.5 Theorem 4.1 is proved.
4.1 Weaknesses
Definition 4.2 (Weakness). Given a strategy σ for Player 1, a finite play
h ∈ S(AS)∗ is a σ-weakness if σ[h] is not 2ǫ-optimal.
Notice that a strategy is 2ǫ-subgame perfect if and only if there is no σ-
weakness.
When playing with strategy σ we say that a weakness occurs in an infinite
play if some finite prefix of it is a σ-weakness.
Let σ be a strategy for Player 1 and h = s0a1s1 . . . an infinite play of a
game. Then h can be factorized in σ-weaknesses in the following way: a) let
h0 = s0a1s1 · · · sn be the shortest prefix of h such that h0 is a σ-weakness,
if no such prefix exists we are done, b) repeat step (a) for the infinite play
snan+1sn+1 · · · . In this way we produce the plays h0, h1, . . . such that for all
i ∈ N:
1. if hi is finite then hi is a σ-weakness,
2. if hi is finite then no strict prefix of hi is a σ-weakness,
3. if hi is infinite then h = h0h1 · · ·hi and no prefix of hi is a σ-weakness,
The reset strategy defined in the following section will reset the memory
when a weakness occurs, hence it will namely reset it after seeing each factor
h0, h1, . . . .
This factorization is made more formal with the following definition of the
function δ, which gives the dates of the factorizations.
Definition 4.3. Let σ be a strategy for Player 1, and s0 . . . sn ∈ S(AS)∗ define
inductively on n
δσ(s0 . . . sn) =
{
n if h is a σ-weakness,
δσ(s0 . . . sn−1) otherwise
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where h = sδσ(s0...sn−1) . . . sn, and δσ(s0) = 0. For n > 0, we say that a weakness
occurs at date n if δσ(s0 . . . sn) = n.
4.2 The reset strategy
Using the notion of a weakness, given some strategy σ, we define another strat-
egy called the reset strategy, that resets the memory whenever a weakness oc-
curs, and the rest of the Section 4 is devoted to proving that given a certain
ǫ-optimal strategy σ then the reset strategy based on it is 2ǫ-subgame perfect.
Definition 4.4 (The reset strategy). Let σ be an ǫ-optimal strategy. We define
the reset strategy σˆ based on σ as the strategy that resets the memory whenever
a weakness occurs, that is
σˆ(s0 . . . sn) = σ(sδσ(s0...sn) . . . sn).
The construction of the reset strategy is an extension of the construction
of the switching strategy in the proof of [Cha07, Theorem 1]; while at most
one memory reset is performed by the switching strategy of [Cha07], the reset
strategy of the present may reset its memory infinitely many times.
The reset strategy has been used in [HG08] to prove the existence of optimal
strategies in games with perfect information and two-valued payoff functions.
Note that in general the two-valued hypothesis is necessary: for example there
is in general no optimal strategy in a game colored by {0, 1} and equipped with
the payoff function
f(c0c1 · · · ) =
{
0 if ∀n ∈ N, cn = 0
1− 2−min{n|cn=1} otherwise.
4.3 Locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies
An action is called value-preserving if it preserves the value of the state, namely
the expected value of the future state will be equal to the value of the present
state. Strategies that play only value-preserving actions are called locally-
optimal strategies. In this section, we prove the somewhat intuitive fact that
for every ǫ′ > 0 there are ǫ′-optimal strategies that are also locally-optimal, and
more interestingly that if one player plays with a locally-optimal strategy, then
the other one is also forced to do so eventually, in almost all trajectories.
4.3.1 Locally-optimal strategies
When we are obviously dealing with only one game we use the notation val(s)
instead of val(G)(s).
Definition 4.5. The action a ∈ A(s) is value-preserving in state s ∈ S if and
only if val(s) =
∑
s′∈S p(s, a, s
′)val(s′). When an action is not value-preserving
we call it value-changing
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Definition 4.6. A strategy is locally-optimal if it plays only value-preserving
actions.
Note that a locally-optimal strategy is not necessarily optimal, but an opti-
mal strategy is locally-optimal. When both players play only value-preserving
actions, it is worth noting that the stochastic process (val(Sn))n∈N is a martin-
gale.
Theorem 4.7. Let σ and τ be strategies for players 1 and 2 respectively, and
s ∈ S. Assume σ is locally-optimal then (val(Sn))n∈N is a submartingale for the
probability measure Pσ,τs . If both σ and τ are locally-optimal then (val(Sn))n∈N
is a martingale.
Proof. By definition f is bounded hence for all n ∈ N, all strategies σ, τ and
states s ∈ S, Eσ,τs [|val(Sn)|] <∞. Then, for locally-optimal σ, strategies τ and
states s ∈ S, Eσ,τs [val(Sn+1) | val(S0), . . . , val(Sn)] is
∑
a∈A(Sn)
σ(S0 · · ·Sn)(a)
(∑
s′∈S p(Sn, a, s
′)val(s′)
)
if Sn ∈ S1 and
∑
a∈A(Sn)
τ(S0 · · ·Sn)(a)
(∑
s′∈S p(Sn, a, s
′)val(s′)
)
otherwise.
And we see that in both cases Eσ,τs [val(Sn+1) | val(S0), . . . , val(Sn)] ≥ val(Sn)
by definition of a locally-optimal strategy σ. Clearly the same proof holds when
τ is also locally-optimal, making the inequality above an equality.
4.3.2 Both players play ultimately only value-preserving actions
In this section we show that if Player 1 plays with a locally optimal strategy then
almost surely both players eventually will play only value-preserving actions. We
actually prove an even stronger fact: under the same hypothesis, both players
eventually play only actions which cannot change the value of the state. First
we define such actions:
Definition 4.8 (Stable actions). For some s ∈ S we call an action a ∈ A(s)
stable if for all s′ ∈ S we have:
p(s, a, s′) > 0 =⇒ val(s) = val(s′).
Note that a stable action is necessarily value-preserving, and a value-changing
action cannot be stable.
Lemma 4.9. For every locally-optimal strategy σ for Player 1, strategy τ for
Player 2 and s ∈ S, Pσ,τs (∃n ∈ N, ∀k ≥ n,An is stable ) = 1.
Proof. In case every action is stable, we have nothing to prove. Assume that
there exists an action a ∈ A(s) which is not stable. Let s′ ∈ S be such that
p(s, a, s′) > 0 and val(s) 6= val(s′). Denote the event “we see action a infinitely
often” by Esa, formally
Esa := {∀m ∈ N, ∃n ≥ m, Sn = s ∧ An+1 = a}.
The goal is to prove that for all locally-optimal strategies σ, t ∈ S and τ we
have Pσ,τt (Esa) = 0. Assume on the contrary that for some locally-optimal σ,
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t ∈ S and τ we have Pσ,τt (Esa) > 0. This implies that also P
σ,τ
t (Esas′) > 0,
where Esas′ := {∀m ∈ N, ∃n ≥ m, Sn = s ∧ An+1 = a ∧ Sn+1 = s′}. And this
in turn implies that when playing with σ, τ and starting from state t, there is
some non-zero probability that for infinitely many n ∈ N,
| val(Sn)− val(Sn+1) | ≥ val(s)− val(s
′) > 0. (12)
Clearly a consequence of (12) is that there is some non-zero probability that
the sequence val(S0), val(S1), . . . does not converge. But according to Theo-
rem 4.7, the process val(S0), val(S1), . . . is a submartingale and it converges
almost surely as a consequence of Doob’s convergence theorem for martingales.
Hence for all locally-optimal strategies σ all t ∈ S and τ we have Pσ,τt (Esa) = 0.
Since stable actions are value-preserving, it implies that when Player 1 plays
with a locally-optimal strategy, value-changing actions are almost surely played
only finitely often.
Corollary 4.10. For every locally-optimal strategy σ, strategy τ and s ∈ S,
P
σ,τ
s (∃n ∈ N, ∀k ≥ n,An is value-preserving in Sn) = 1.
4.3.3 There exist an ǫ-optimal strategy which is locally-optimal
Playing value-changing actions strictly decreases (or increases, depending on
which player plays it) the expected payoff hence it is intuitive that for every
ǫ′ > 0 there are ǫ′-optimal strategies for both players, that play only value-
preserving actions.
This is made rigorous in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. Let ǫ′ > 0, and a ∈ A(s) a value-changing action in state s ∈ S1.
Then there exists an ǫ′-optimal strategy for Player 1 that never plays action a.
The proof simply associates with every strategy using a, a better strategy
that does not use a.
Proof. Let G′ be the game identical to G except that a 6∈ A(s) (action a is
removed). For all t ∈ S it is immediate that val(G)(t) ≥ val(G′)(t) since
Player 1 has one more action to choose from in the game G, while Player 2
has the same number of actions to choose from. Hence our goal is to prove the
following:
∀t ∈ S, val(G′)(t) ≥ val(G)(t). (13)
We split the proof of (13) in two cases, for t = s and t 6= s.
• val(G′)(s) ≥ val(G)(s)
Let d = val(G)(s)−
∑
t∈S p(s, a)(t)val(G)(t) > 0, and τ the strategy for
Player 2 inG that plays according to strategy τ ′ which is ǫ′-optimal inG′,
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as long as Player 1 does not choose the value-changing action a. In case
she chooses it, τ switches definitely to the strategy τ ′′ that is d2 -optimal
in G. Let Opt be the event (∀n ∈ N, Sn = s =⇒ An+1 6= a), that is the
event that Player 1 never chooses the value-changing action a.
When playing with the strategy τ we have the following properties, for all
t and σ:
E
σ,τ
t [f | Opt] ≤ val(G
′)(t) + ǫ′ (14)
E
σ,τ
t [f | ¬Opt] ≤ val(G)(s)− d+
d
2
(15)
To show (14), note because of the condition Opt the game is played only
in G′, hence the strategy σ even though it is a strategy in G it be-
haves like the strategy σ′ in G′ defined in the following way: for all
h = s0 . . . sn ∈ S(AS)∗, and b ∈ A(sn), σ′(h)(b) = Pσ,τs0 (hb | h ∧ Opt).
That is Eσ,τt [f | Opt] = E
σ′,τ ′
t [f ], because τ never has to switch to τ
′′.
Now (14) is a direct consequence of the ǫ′-optimality of τ ′.
We get (15), because when Player 1 chooses the action a, τ switches to the
τ ′′ strategy which is d2 -optimal inG, and the decrease by d is a consequence
of the choice of the action a, and the definition of d.
Since Eσ,τt [f ] is a convex combination of E
σ,τ
t [f | Opt] and E
σ,τ
t [f | ¬Opt],
as a consequence of (14) and (15) we have that for all t ∈ S, ǫ′ > 0 and σ,
E
σ,τ
t [f ] ≤ max{val(G
′)(t) + ǫ′, val(G)(s)−
d
2
}.
Taking t = s and the supremum over all σ, since the inequality above
holds for any ǫ′ > 0, we get val(G′)(s) ≥ val(G)(s).
• ∀t ∈ S, t 6= s, and val(G′)(t) ≥ val(G)(t)
Let Swσ be the event (∃n ∈ N, Sn = s ∧ σ(S0 . . . Sn)(a) > 0), that is
the event that according to σ the value-changing action a is about to be
played at some date n. For every strategy σ define σs as the strategy in
G′ that plays like σ as long as the latter does not choose the action a
(with nonzero probability), and when it does, σs switches to the strategy
σ′ that is ǫ′-optimal in G′. Let τ be the strategy for Player 2 which plays
according to the strategy τ ′ which is ǫ′-optimal in G′ as long as Player 1
does not choose the action a, otherwise it switches to strategy τ ′′ that is
ǫ′-optimal in G.
Since pairs of strategies σ, τ coincide to σs, τ
′ up to the date n in the event
Swσ, we write c = P
σ,τ
t (Swσ) = P
σs,τ
′
t (SWσ). From the definition of τ ,
σs and the fact that val(G)(s) = val(G
′)(s), shown above we have:
E
σ,τ
t [f | Swσ] ≤ val(G)(s) + ǫ
′ = val(G′)(s) + ǫ′, and
val(G′)(s) − ǫ′ ≤ Eσs,τt [f | Swσ].
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Combining the two inequalities above we get
E
σ,τ
t [f | Swσ] ≤ E
σs,τ
t [f | Swσ] + 2ǫ
′. (16)
Keeping this in mind we proceed:
E
σ,τ
t [f ] = cE
σ,τ
t [f | Swσ] + (1− c)E
σ,τ
t [f | ¬Swσ]
≤ c(Eσs,τt [f | Swσ] + 2ǫ
′) + (1− c)Eσs,τt [f | ¬Swσ]
= Eσs,τt [f ] + 2cǫ
′
= Eσs,τ
′
t [f ] + 2cǫ
′ ≤ val(G′)(t) + ǫ′(2c+ 1)
where the first equality is a basic property of expectations, the first in-
equality is from (16) and because on the paths of the event ¬Swσ the
strategies σ and σs coincide, the following equality is a basic property of
expectations, while the second one and the last inequality are by definition
of the strategy τ . We have Eσs,τt [f ] = E
σs,τ
′
t [f ] because by definition of
the switch strategy the action a is never played hence τ never switches to
the strategy τ ′′.
Since this holds for any ǫ′ > 0, taking the supremum over strategies σ we
get val(G′)(t) ≥ val(G)(t) as desired.
Having proved that for all states, the values in both G and G′ coincide, we
have shown that there are ǫ′-optimal strategies for Player 1 that never play the
value-changing action a.
Corollary 4.12. For all ǫ′ > 0 both players have ǫ′-optimal strategies that are
locally-optimal.
The proof is by induction on the number of actions which are not value-
preserving, using Lemma 4.11. The argument for Player 2 is completely sym-
metric.
We finish this section with a corollary to Proposition 2.8. When Player 1
plays with a locally-optimal strategy, we are interested in what happens when
the process val(S0), val(S1), . . . is stopped at random, in particular stopped
at the first σ-weakness after some date n. The answer is provided by Doob’s
optional stopping theorem:
Corollary 4.13. Let T be a stopping time with respect to (Sn)n∈N. Then for
all locally-optimal strategies σ, all strategies τ and states s ∈ S, (val(Sn))n∈N
converges almost-surely and
E
σ,τ
s [lim
n
val(Smin(n,T ))] ≥ val(s).
In case we assume τ to be locally-optimal instead of σ the converse inequality
holds.
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Proof. Immediate from Proposition 2.8, since in a game where both players play
with a locally-optimal strategy (val(Sn))n∈N forms a martingale (Theorem 4.7),
and if only Player 1 plays with a locally-optimal strategy then (val(Sn))n∈N is
a submartingale. From the hypothesis that the payoff function f is bounded,
we have that the values are also bounded.
4.4 Only finitely many weaknesses occur when playing σˆ
The goal of this section is to demonstrate that when playing with the reset
strategy based on some ǫ-optimal and locally-optimal strategy σ for Player 1
there are almost-surely only finitely many σ-weaknesses.
Definition 4.14. We define the event
{there is no σ-weakness after date n}
as the event {∀m > n, δσ(S0 · · ·Sm) ≤ n}. And the event
{there are two σ-weaknesses after date n}
as the event {∃m,m′,m > m′ > n, δσ(S0 · · ·Sm) = m ∧ δσ(S0 · · ·Sm′) = m′}.
Lemma 4.15. Let σ be a locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategy, and σˆ the reset
strategy based on it. For all strategies τ and states s ∈ S there exists n ∈ N
such that
P
σˆ,τ
s (there are two σ-weaknesses after date n) < 1.
For Lemma 4.15, we proceed in a couple of steps. First, we assume that
Player 2 chooses a locally-optimal strategy and prove that the chance of having
a weakness is bounded away from 1. This is shown by proving the existence of
another strategy for Player 2 that takes advantage of the weakness and provides
a contradiction of the hypothesis that σ is ǫ-optimal. This is Lemma 4.16.
In the next step, we fix a locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategy for Player
1 and build the reset strategy based on it. Then we prove the same statement
as in Lemma 4.15 but we restrict Player 2 to strategies which are sure to be
locally-optimal after some date n. This is Lemma 4.17. After these two facts
we can proceed with the proof of Lemma 4.15.
Lemma 4.16. Let σ be an ǫ-optimal strategy, then there exists µ > 0 such that
for all strategy τ and s ∈ S, if τ is locally-optimal,
P
σ,τ
s (∃n, S0 · · ·Sn is a σ-weakness) ≤ 1− µ.
Proof. We define F = min{n ∈ N | S0 · · ·Sn is a σ-weakness} with the conven-
tion min ∅ = ∞, and let σ be an ǫ-optimal strategy for Player 1, then for a
given n ∈ N, m > n and prefix s0 . . . sm ∈ S(AS)∗, define weak(n, s0 . . . sm) :=
(δσ(s0 . . . sm) = m)∧ (δσ(s0 . . . sm−1) ≤ n), the boolean function characterizing
the prefixes up to the first weakness after date n.
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The event F < ∞ means that a ”weakness occurs”, and is equivalent to
the event given in the statement of the lemma. Let τ be a strategy for Player
2 and s ∈ S. Let M and m be upper and lower bound respectively of the
payoff function f , and let τ ′ be the strategy that plays identically to τ as long
as weakness does not occur, and when a weakness occurs it switches to a ǫ2 -
optimal response τ ′′. Since strategies τ and τ ′ coincide up to the first weakness
let c = Pσ,τ
′
s (F = ∞) = P
σ,τ
s (F = ∞). From the ǫ-optimality of σ, and a basic
property of conditional expectations:
val(s)− ǫ ≤ Eσ,τ
′
s [f ]
= (1− c) · Eσ,τ
′
s [f | F <∞] + c · E
σ,τ ′
s [f | F =∞]
≤ (1− c) · Eσ,τ
′
s [f | F <∞] + cM.
(17)
As a subsequence of the strategy τ ′ namely that it resets to the strategy τ ′′ if
a weakness occurs, by shifting up to the first weakness we get:
E
σ,τ ′
s [f | F <∞] =
∑
s0...sn∈S(AS)
∗
weak(0,s0...sn)
P
σ,τ ′
s (s0 . . . sn|F <∞)E
σ[s0...sn],τ
′′
sn [f ]
≤
∑
s0...sn∈S(AS)
∗
weak(0,s0...sn)
P
σ,τ ′
s (s0 . . . sn|F <∞)(val(sn)− 2ǫ+
ǫ
2
)
= Eσ,τ
′
s [val(SF ) | F <∞]−
3
2
ǫ,
the inequality is a subsequence of the strategy τ ′ that takes advantage of the
weakness, and by the definition of a weakness. Replacing this inequality in (17):
val(s)− ǫ ≤ (1− c) · Eσ,τ
′
s [val(SF ) | F <∞]−
3
2
ǫ(1− c) + cM
= Eσ,τ
′
s [val(SF )] + c(M − E
σ,τ ′
s [val(SF ) | F =∞])−
3
2
ǫ(1− c)
≤ val(s) + c(M − Eσ,τ
′
s [val(SF ) | F =∞])−
3
2
ǫ(1− c)
≤ val(s) + c(M −m)−
3
2
ǫ(1− c)
where in the equality we have decomposed (1 − c) · Eσ,τ
′
s [val(SF ) | F < ∞]
to Eσ,τ
′
s [val(SF )] − c · E
σ,τ ′
s [val(SF ) | F = ∞], and the second inequality is
a consequence of the following: F is a stopping time, and (val(Sn))n∈N is
a martingale because Player 2 is playing only value-preserving actions, thus
applying Corollary 4.13 we get Eσ,τ
′
s [val(SF )] ≤ val(s). Finally from above:
µ = ǫ2(M−m+3/2ǫ) ≤ c, a uniform bound, that does not depend on the choice of
τ .
In the next step we approximate the strategy τ of player 2 by a sequence
of strategies (τn)n and give an upper bound on the probability that two σ-
weaknesses occur in the play provided when player 1 plays the reset strategy
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and player 2 plays strategy τn. The definition of τn relies on the notion of value-
preserving actions (Definition, 4.5). For a state s ∈ S denote by V p(s) the set
of value-preserving actions in s and for a finite set R denote U(R) the uniform
distribution on R.
Lemma 4.17. Let σ be a locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategy for player 1,
and σˆ the reset strategy based on it. Let τ be any strategy for player 2. For
every integer n, define τn to be the following strategy:
τn(s0 . . . sm) =


τ(s0 . . . sm) if m < n
or ∀a ∈ A, (τ(s0 . . . sm)a) > 0) =⇒ (a ∈ V p(sm))
U(V p(s)) otherwise
Then there exists µ > 0 such that for all s ∈ S and n ∈ N,
P
σˆ,τn
s ( there are two σ-weakness after date n ) ≤ 1− µ.
Proof. For every n ∈ N, define Fn = min{m > n | δσ(S0 . . . Sm) = m} and
min ∅ = ∞, the date of the first weakness strictly after n, and F 2n = FFn the
date of the second weakness strictly after n. With the convention F∞ =∞.
We prove that there exists µ > 0 such that for all n ∈ N, strategy τ , and
state s ∈ S,
P
σˆ,τn
s (F
2
n <∞ | Fn <∞) ≤ 1− µ. (18)
Let µ be given by Lemma 4.16 and weak defined like in the proof of Lemma 4.16,
that is weak(n, s0 . . . sm) := (δσ(s0 . . . sm) = m) ∧ (δσ(s0 . . . sm−1) ≤ n), the
boolean function characterizing the prefixes up to the first weakness after date
n. Then (18) is a consequence of:
P
σˆ,τn
s (F
2
n <∞ | Fn <∞) =
∑
h=s0...sm∈S(AS)
∗
weak(n,h)
P
σˆ,τn
s (F
2
n <∞ | h ∧ Fn <∞) · P
σˆ,τn
s (h | Fn <∞)
=
∑
h=s0...sm∈S(AS)
∗
weak(n,h)
P
σˆ,τn
s (F
2
n <∞ | h) · P
σˆ,τn
s (h | Fn <∞)
=
∑
h=s0...sm∈S(AS)
∗
weak(n,h)
P
σˆ,τn[h]
sm (F0 <∞) · P
σˆ,τn
s (h | Fn <∞)
=
∑
h=s0...sm∈S(AS)
∗
weak(n,h)
P
σ,τn[h]
sm (F0 <∞) · P
σˆ,τn
s (h | Fn <∞)
≤ 1− µ
where the first and second equalities hold because
{Fn <∞} =
⋃
h=s0...sm∈S(AS)
∗
weak(n,h)
h(AS)ω,
the third equality because if weak(n, h) then σˆ[h] = σˆ, the fourth equality is a
consequence of Lemma 4.20 since σ and σˆ coincide up to the first σ-weakness
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and the last inequality holds by definition of τn and because |h| ≥ n, as a
consequence τn[h] is locally-optimal and we can apply Lemma 4.16.
Then we have Pσˆ,τns (F
2
n <∞) = P
σˆ,τn
s (F
2
n <∞ | Fn <∞)P
σˆ,τn
s (Fn <∞) ≤
1− µ. Because Pσˆ,τns (F
2
n <∞ | Fn =∞) = 0, by definition of Fn.
After establishing the previous two lemmas we are now ready to proceed
with the proof of Lemma 4.15
Proof of Lemma 4.15. Let Ω be the random variable taking values in N ∪ {∞}
that maps to the date of the last value-changing action played, if it exists,
otherwise let it be ∞. Let τn be defined as in Lemma 4.17. Because τ and τn
coincide on all paths where the last value-changing action is played before n,
that is on the event {Ω < n}, then for any n ∈ N and event E:
P
σˆ,τ
s (E) = P
σˆ,τ
s (Ω < n)P
σˆ,τn
s (E | Ω < n) + P
σˆ,τ
s (Ω ≥ n)P
σˆ,τ
s (E | Ω ≥ n).
Since σˆ is locally-optimal we can apply Corollary 4.10, we have limn P
σˆ,τ
s (Ω <
n) = 1, therefore
P
σˆ,τn
s (E) −−−−→
n→∞
P
σˆ,τ
s (E).
Let µ > 0 be the uniform bound in accord with Lemma 4.17, and fix n ∈ N
such that for all events E we have |Pσˆ,τs (E) − P
σˆ,τn
s (E)| < µ. For some n
′ > n
take E to be the event {there is a weakness after date n′}, and apply Lemma
4.17 to conclude this proof.
To conclude this section what is left to show is that when we are playing
with the reset strategy, the number of weaknesses is almost surely finite.
Lemma 4.18. Let σ be a locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategy, and σˆ the reset
strategy based on it. Then for all strategies τ and states s ∈ S,
P
σˆ,τ
s (∃n, there is no σ-weakness after date n) = 1 .
Proof. Let L = limn δσ(S0S1 . . . Sn) ∈ N ∪ {∞}, which is well-defined since
(δσ(S0S1 . . . Sn))n∈N is pointwise increasing. Fix ǫ
′ > 0, and choose τ and s
such that:
sup
τ ′,s′
P
σˆ,τ ′
s′ (L =∞) ≤ P
σˆ,τ
s (L =∞) + ǫ
′. (19)
Let n ∈ N be such that according to Lemma 4.15 µ = Pσˆ,τs (Fn <∞) < 1. Then
we have the following:
P
σˆ,τ
s (L =∞) = E
σˆ,τ
s [P
σˆ,τ
s (L =∞ | Fn, S0, . . . , SFn)]
= Eσˆ,τs [1Fn<∞ · P
σˆ,τ
s (L =∞ | Fn, S0, . . . , SFn)]
= Eσˆ,τs [1Fn<∞ · P
σˆ,τ [S0...SFn ]
SFn
(L =∞)]
≤ Eσˆ,τs [1Fn<∞ · (P
σˆ,τ
s (L =∞) + ǫ
′)]
= µ(Pσˆ,τs (L =∞) + ǫ
′)
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First equality is a basic property of conditional expectations, the second one is a
consequence of Pσˆ,τs (Fn <∞ | L =∞) = 1, the third one is from the definition
of the reset strategy σˆ, the inequality is because of (19). Hence, because µ < 1
we have Pσˆ,τs (L =∞) ≤
µ
1−µ ǫ
′. And finally for all s′′ ∈ S and τ ′′ we have
P
σˆ,τ ′′
s′′ (L =∞) ≤ sup
τ ′,s′
P
σˆ,τ ′
s′ (L =∞)
≤ Pσˆ,τs (L =∞) + ǫ
′
≤
ǫ′
1− µ
.
Since this holds for any ǫ′ > 0, we get Pσˆ,τs (L =∞) = 0.
4.5 The reset strategy is 2ǫ-subgame-perfect
The first goal is to prove the ǫ-optimality of the reset strategy, which is done
first for a variant of the reset strategy that reset only up to some date.
Let σ be some ǫ-optimal strategy, we define σˆn as the strategy that resets
only up to time n ∈ N,
σˆn(s0 . . . sm) = σ(sδσ(s0...sm∧n) . . . sn)
where m ∧ n = min{m,n}.
Lemma 4.19. Let σ be a locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategy, and σˆ the reset
strategy based on it. Then for all strategies τ , states s ∈ S and all n ∈ N,
E
σˆn,τ
s [f ] ≥ val(s)− ǫ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n, and decomposing the expected payoff on
the event of a weakness at date n+ 1.
The base case is true by definition since σˆ0 = σ, and the induction hypothesis
is that for all τ and s ∈ S, Eσˆn,τs [f ] ≥ val(s) − ǫ. We have to show that the
same holds when Player 1 plays with the strategy σˆn+1. Fix a strategy τ and a
state s. Let τ ′ be the strategy that plays like τ except if there is a weakness at
date n + 1 (in case of the event δσ(S0 . . . Sn+1) = n + 1), then it resets to the
ǫ
2 -optimal response τ
′′. Let Ln = δσ(S0 . . . Sn). We decompose the expected
values on the only event that matters, namely the event of a weakness at the
date n + 1. Let R be the set of all prefixes of length n + 1 where a weakness
occurs, that is R = {s0 . . . sn+1 ∈ S(AS)∗ | δσ,ǫ(s0 . . . sn+1) = n+ 1}.
Then:
{Ln+1 = n+ 1} =
⋃
h∈R
h(AS)ω
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thus we have the two following inequalities. First,
E
σˆn+1,τ
s [f ] = E
σˆn+1,τ
s [1Ln+1=n+1 · f ] + E
σˆn+1,τ
s [1Ln+1 6=n+1 · f ]
=
∑
s0...sn+1∈R
P
σˆn+1,τ
s (s0 . . . sn+1)E
σ,τ [s0...sn+1]
sn+1 [f ] + E
σˆn+1,τ
s [1Ln+1 6=n+1 · f ]
≥
∑
s0...sn+1∈R
P
σˆn+1,τ
s (s0 . . . sn+1)(val(sn+1)− ǫ) + E
σˆn+1,τ
s [1Ln+1 6=n+1 · f ],
where the second equality holds because for every s0 · · · sn+1 ∈ R and σˆn+1[s0 · · · sn+1] =
σ, and the inequality by ǫ-optimality of σ. Second,
E
σˆn,τ
′
s [f ] = E
σˆn,τ
′
s [1Ln+1=n+1 · f ] + E
σˆn,τ
′
s [1Ln+1 6=n+1 · f ]
=
∑
s0...sn+1∈R
P
σˆn,τ
′
s (s0 . . . sn+1)E
σˆn[s0...sn+1],τ
′′
sn+1 [f ] + E
σˆn,τ
′
s [1Ln+1 6=n+1 · f ]
≤
∑
s0...sn+1∈R
P
σˆn,τ
′
s (s0 . . . sn+1)(val(sn+1)− 2ǫ+
ǫ
2
) + Eσˆn,τ
′
s [1Ln+1 6=n+1 · f ],
where the second equality is by construction of τ ′ and the inequality because
τ ′′ is chosen as the ǫ2 -optimal response to σ[s0 . . . sn+1], which is not 2ǫ-optimal
by definition of R.
We can combine the two inequalities above because both strategies σˆn and
σˆn+1 on one hand and both strategies τ and τ
′ on the other hand coincide upon
all paths of length less than n + 1 and also upon all paths where no weakness
occurs at date n + 1, therefore the second terms on the right hand side of the
two inequalities above coincide and the same holds for the first terms (without
the ǫ terms) hence
E
σˆn,τ
′
s [f ] ≤ E
σˆn+1,τ
s [f ].
According to the induction hypothesis σˆn is ǫ-optimal thus
val(s)− ǫ ≤ Eσˆn+1,τs [f ].
Since this holds for every τ , σˆn+1 is ǫ-optimal, which completes the proof of the
inductive step.
Having shown that the strategies σˆn are ǫ-optimal we can proceed into prov-
ing that the reset strategy σˆ itself is ǫ-optimal. First we need to give a link
between the strategies σˆ and σˆn, in the form of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.20. Let E be an event, and σ1,σ2 two strategies for Player 1 such
that for all prefixes p of an infinite play in E, σ1(p) = σ2(p). Then for all payoff
functions f , strategies for Player 2 τ , and s ∈ S,
E
σ1,τ
s [f · 1E ] = E
σ2,τ
s [f · 1E ].
Proof. This is obvious when f is the indicator of a cylinder, and the class of
functions f with this property is closed by linear combinations and simple limits.
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Lemma 4.21. Let σ be a locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategy, and σˆ the reset
strategy based on it, then σˆ is ǫ-optimal.
Proof. Let m and M be the lower and upper bounds of the payoff function f
respectively. Let L = limn δσ(S0S1 . . . Sn) ∈ N ∪ {∞}, which is well-defined
since (δσ(S0S1 . . . Sn))n∈N is pointwise increasing.
Applying Lemma 4.19 gives us
val(s)− ǫ ≤ Eσˆn,τs [f · 1L≤n] + E
σˆn,τ
s [f · 1L>n]
≤ Eσˆn,τs [f · 1L≤n] +MP
σˆn,τ
s (L > n).
From here, since σˆ and σˆn coincide upon all plays in {L ≤ n}, using Lemma
4.20 we get
E
σˆ,τ
s [f ]− E
σˆ,τ
s [f · 1L>n] = E
σˆ,τ
s [f · 1L≤n]
= Eσˆn,τs [f · 1L≤n]
≥ val(s)− ǫ −MPσˆn,τs (L > n).
Since for any measurable function f , Lemma 4.20 holds, applying it to the
constant function that maps to 1, gives us Pσˆ,τs (L ≤ n) = P
σˆn,τ
s (L ≤ n), hence
E
σˆ,τ
s [f ] ≥ val(s)− ǫ − (M −m)P
σˆ,τ
s (L > n).
And the inequality above holds for any n, according to Lemma 4.18, limn(M −
m)Pσˆ,τs (L > n) = 0, hence
E
σˆ,τ
s [f ] ≥ val(s)− ǫ.
Having shown that the reset strategy is ǫ-optimal, using similar ideas we
prove that the reset strategy is also 2ǫ-subgame-perfect.
Theorem 4.22. Let σ be a locally-optimal and ǫ-optimal strategy, and σˆ the
reset strategy based on it, then σˆ is 2ǫ-subgame-perfect.
Proof. Let s0 . . . sn ∈ S(AS)∗ be some finite prefix of an infinite play, then we
have to show that
inf
τ
E
σˆ[s0...sn],τ
sn [f ] ≥ val(sn)− 2ǫ.
In the case when δσ(s0 . . . sn) = n we have infτ E
σˆ[s0...sn],τ
sn [f ] = infτ E
σˆ,τ
sn [f ] ≥
val(sn)−ǫ from the definition of σˆ and Lemma 4.21. Assume that δσ(s0 . . . sn) <
n, which gives us
δσ(s0 . . . sn) = δσ(s0 . . . sn−1),
and,
inf
τ
E
σ[sδ(s0 ...sn−1)...sn],τ
sn [f ] ≥ val(sn)− 2ǫ. (20)
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by definition of the function δσ, when δσ(s0 . . . sn) 6= n. Assume that there
exists a strategy τ such that E
σˆ[s0...sn],τ
sn [f ] < val(sn) − 2ǫ, then we will show
that from τ we can build another strategy τ ′ such that
E
σ[sδ(s0 ...sn−1)...sn],τ
′
sn [f ] < val(sn)− 2ǫ,
a contradiction of (20). Let τ ′ be the strategy that plays like τ as long as
no weakness occurs, and in case it does, it switches to the ǫ-response strat-
egy τ ′′. Let L = limn δσ(S0S1 . . . Sn) ∈ N ∪ {∞}, which is well-defined since
(δσ(S0S1 . . . Sn))n∈N is pointwise increasing. Define F = min{n ∈ N | S0 · · ·Sn is a σ-weakness}
with the convention min ∅ =∞. Let σˆ1 = σˆ[s0 . . . sn] and σ2 = σ[sδ(s0...sn−1)...sn ],
then we have
val(sn)− 2ǫ > E
σˆ1,τ
sn [f · 1L=0] + E
σˆ1,τ
sn [f · 1F<∞]
= Eσ2,τ
′
sn [f · 1L=0] + E
σˆ1,τ
sn [f · 1F<∞]
= Eσ2,τ
′
sn [f ]− E
σ2,τ
′
sn [f · 1F<∞] + E
σˆ1,τ
sn [f · 1F<∞],
(21)
where the first inequality is by assumption on the strategy τ (and also be-
cause {L = 0} = {F = ∞}), the first equality is because both pairs of
strategies σˆ1, σ2 and τ, τ
′ coincide up to the first weakness. Let weak be
the boolean function characterizing the prefixes up to first weakness that is
weakσ(s0 . . . sn) := (δσ(s0 . . . sn) = n)∧ (δσ(s0 . . . sn−1) ≤ n). Then for the last
two terms in (21) we have:
E
σˆ1,τ
sn [f · 1F<∞] =
∑
t0...tm∈S(AS)
∗
weakσ(t0...tm)
P
σˆ1,τ
sn (t0 . . . tm)E
σˆ,τ [t0...tm]
tm [f ]
≥
∑
t0...tm∈S(AS)
∗
weakσ(t0...tm)
P
σˆ1,τ
sn (t0 . . . tm)(val(tm)− ǫ),
this is by the definition of σˆ and Lemma 4.21, while for the other term
E
σ2,τ
′
sn [f · 1F<∞] =
∑
t0...tm∈S(AS)
∗
weakσ(t0 ...tm)
P
σ2,τ
′
sn (t0 . . . tm)E
σ2 [t0...tm],τ
′
tm [f ]
≤
∑
t0...tm∈S(AS
∗)
weakσ(t0 ...tm)
P
σ2,τ
′
sn (t0 . . . tm)(val(tm)− 2ǫ+ ǫ)
in the probabilities of the cylinders t0 . . . tm we can freely interchange the pairs of
strategies σˆ1, σ2 and τ, τ
′, since they coincide up to the first weakness. Therefore
we get that
E
σˆ1,τ
sn [f · 1F<∞] ≥ E
σ2,τ
′
sn [f · 1F<∞],
which is the promised contradiction of (20) when replacing it into (21)
22
5 Games with Shift-Invariant and Submixing Pay-
off Functions are Half-Positional
In this section, we introduce the class of shift-invariant and submixing payoff
functions and we prove that in every game equipped with such a payoff function,
Player 1 has a deterministic and stationary strategy which is optimal.
The definition of a submixing payoff function relies on the notion of the
shuffle of two words. A factorization of a sequence u ∈ Cω is an infinite sequence
(un)n∈N ∈ (C∗)N of finite sequences whose u is the concatenation i.e. such that
u = u0u1u2 · · · . A sequence w ∈ Cω is said to be a shuffle of u ∈ Cω and
v ∈ Cω if there exists two factorizations u = u0u1u2 · · · and v = v0v1v2 · · · of u
and v such that w = u0v0u1v1u2v2 · · · .
Definition 5.1 (Submixing payoff functions). A payoff function f : Cω → R
is submixing if for every infinite words u, v, w ∈ Cω such that w is a shuffle of
u ∈ Cω and v ∈ Cω,
f(w) ≤ max{f(u), f(v)} . (22)
In other words, the submixing condition states that the payoff of the shuffle
of two plays cannot be strictly greater than both payoffs of these plays.
We can now state our main result.
Theorem 5.2. Let f be a payoff function and G a game equipped with f .
Suppose that f is shift-invariant and submixing. Then the game G has a value
and Player 1 has an optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary.
The shift-invariant and submixing properties are sufficient but not necessary
to ensure the existence of a pure and stationary optimal strategy for Player 1,
there are counter-examples in Section 6. Necessary and sufficient conditions for
positionality are known for deterministic games [GZ05].
However the shift-invariant and submixing conditions are general enough to
recover several known results of existence of deterministic stationary optimal
strategies, and to provide several new examples of games with deterministic
stationary optimal strategies, as is shown in the two next sections.
5.1 Proof of Half-Positionality
We prove Theorem 5.2. Let f : Cω → R be a shift-invariant and submixing
payoff function and G a game equipped with f . For the sake of simplicity we
suppose without loss of generality that the alphabet of f is C = S×A.
We prove Theorem 5.2 by induction on N(G) =
∑
s∈S1
(|A(s)| − 1). If
N(G) = 0 then in every state controlled by Player 1 there is only one action
available, thus Player 1 has a unique strategy which is optimal, deterministic
and stationary.
Let G be a game N(G) > 0 and suppose Theorem 5.2 has been proved
for every game G′ such that N(G′) < N(G). Since N(G) > 0 there exists
a state s ∈ S1 such that A(s) has at least two elements. Let (A0(s),A1(s))
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be a partition of A(s) in two non-empty sets. Let G0 and G1 be the two
games obtained from G by restricting actions in state s to A0(s) and A1(s)
respectively. According to the induction hypothesis, both G0 and G1 have
values, let val0(s) and val1(s) denote the values of state s in G0 and G1.
To prove the existence of a deterministic stationary optimal strategy in G
it is enough to prove:
minmax(G)(s) ≤ max{val0(s), val1(s)} , (23)
Since every strategy of Player 1 in G0 and G1 is a strategy in G as well, then
val0(s) ≤ val(s) and val1(s) ≤ val(s). Moreover according to the induction
hypothesis there exist deterministic stationary optimal strategies σ0 and σ1 in
G0 and G1. Suppose that (23) holds, and without loss of generality suppose
minmax(G)(s) ≤ val0(s). Since the deterministic stationary σ0 is optimal in
G0, it guarantees for every τ and s ∈ S, Eσ0,τs [f ] ≥ val0(s) ≥ minmax(G)(s),
thus σ0 is optimal not only in the gameG0 but in the gameG as well. Thus (23)
is enough to prove the inductive step.
5.2 The projection mapping
To prove (23), we make use of two mappings
π0 : s(AS)
∞ → s(AS)∞ (24)
π1 : s(AS)
∞ → s(AS)∞. (25)
First π0 and π1 are defined on finite words. The mapping π0 associates with
each finite play h ∈ (SA)∗ in G with source s a finite play π0(h) in G0.
Intuitively, play π0(h) is obtained by erasing from h some of its subwords.
Remember that (A0(s),A1(s)) is a partition of A(s) hence every occurrence of
state s in the play h is followed by an action a which is either in A0(s) or in
A1(s). To obtain π0(h) one erases from h two types of subwords:
1. all simple cycles on s starting with an action in A1(s) are deleted from h,
2. in case the last occurrence of s in h is followed by an action in A1(s) then
the corresponding suffix is deleted from h.
Formally, π0 and π1 are defined as follows. Let h = s0a0s1a1 · · · sn ∈ s(AS)∗
and i0 < i1 < . . . < ik = {0 ≤ i ≤ n | si = s} the increasing sequence of dates
where the play reaches s. For 0 ≤ l < k let hl the l-th factor of h defined by
hl = silail · · · ail+1−1 and hk = sikaik · · · an−1sn. Then for j ∈ {0, 1},
πj(h) =
∏
0≤l≤k
ail
∈Aj
hl ,
where
∏
denotes word concatenation.
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We extend π0 and π1 to infinite words in a natural way: for an infinite play
h ∈ s(AS)ω then π0(h) is the limit of the sequence (π0(hn))n∈N, where hn is
the prefix of h of length 2n+1. Remark that π0(h) may be a finite play, in case
play h has an infinite suffix such that every occurrence of s is followed by an
action of A1(s).
We make use of the four following properties of π0 and π1. For every infinite
play h ∈ (SA)ω ,
(A) if π0(h) is finite then h has a suffix which is an infinite play in G1 starting
in s,
(B) if π1(h) is finite then h has a suffix which is an infinite play in G0 starting
in s,
(C) if both π0(h) and π1(h) are infinite then both π0(h) and π1(h) reach state
s infinitely often,
(D) if both π0(h) and π1(h) are infinite, then h is a shuffle of π0(h) and π1(h).
We use the three following random variables:
Π = S0A1S1 · · · , (26)
Π0 = π0(S0A1S1 · · · ) , (27)
Π1 = π1(S0A1S1 · · · ) . (28)
5.3 The trigger strategy
We build a strategy τ ♯ for Player 2 called the trigger strategy.
According to Theorem 4.1, there exists ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies τ ♯0 and
τ
♯
1 in the games G0 and G1 respectively. The strategy τ
♯ is a combination of
τ
♯
0 and τ
♯
1 . Intuitively the strategy τ
♯ switches between τ ♯0 and τ
♯
1 depending on
the action chosen at the last visit in s. Let h be a finite play in s(AS)∗ and
last(h) ∈ A the action played after the last visit of h to s and t the last state of
h, then:
τ ♯(h) =
{
τ
♯
0(π0(h)t) if last(h) ∈ A0
τ
♯
1(π1(h)t) if last(h) ∈ A1.
We are going to prove that the trigger strategy τ ♯ is ǫ-optimal for Player 2,
thanks to three following key properties. For every strategy σ for Player 1 ,
E
σ,τ♯
s [ f | Π0 is finite] ≤ val1(s) + ǫ , (29)
E
σ,τ♯
s [ f | Π1 is finite] ≤ val0(s) + ǫ , (30)
E
σ,τ♯
s [ f | Π0 and Π1 are both infinite]
≤ max{val0(s), val1(s)} + ǫ . (31)
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5.4 Proof of inequalities (29) and (30)
To prove inequality (29), we introduce the probability measure µ1 on plays in
G1 defined as:
µ1(E) = P
σ,τ♯
s (Π1 ∈ E | Π0 is finite) ,
and the strategy σ′1 for Player 1 in G1 defined for every play h controlled by
Player 1 by:
σ′1(h)(a) = P
σ,τ♯
s (ha  Π1 | h  Π1 and Π0 is finite) ,
where  denotes the prefix relation over words of S∞:
∀u ∈ C∗, v ∈ C∞, u  v ⇐⇒ ∃w ∈ C∞, v = u · w ,
and ≺ the strict prefix relation.
We abuse the notation and denote h and ha for the events h(AS)ω and
ha(SA)ω, so that
σ′1(h)(a) = µ1(ha | h) .
The probability measure µ1 has the following key properties. For every finite
play h in the game G1 whose finite state is t,
µ1(ha | h) =
{
σ′1(h)(a) if t ∈ S1,
τ
♯
1(h)(a) if t ∈ S2 ,
(32)
µ1(has | ha) = p(s|t, a). (33)
As a consequence of the equalities (32) and (33), and according to the char-
acterization given by (1) and (2) the probability measure µ1 coincides with the
probability measure P
σ′1,τ
♯
1
s . Since τ
♯
1 is ǫ-optimal in the gameG1, it implies (29).
The proof of (30) is symmetrical.
5.5 Proof of inequality (31)
The proof of (31) requires several steps.
First, we prove that for every strategy σ in G, there exists a strategy σ0 in
G0 such that for every measurable event E ⊆ (SA)ω in G0,
P
σ0,τ
♯
0
s (E) ≥ P
σ,τ♯
s (Π0 is infinite and Π0 ∈ E) . (34)
The strategy σ0 in G0 is defined for every finite play controlled by Player 1
by:
σ0(h)(a) = P
σ,τ♯
s (ha  Π0 | h ≺ Π0) ,
if Pσ,τ
♯
s (h ≺ Π0) > 0 and otherwise σ0(h) is chosen arbitrarily. We prove
that (34) holds. Let E be the set of measurable events E ⊆ (SA)ω in G0
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such that (34) is satisfied. First, E contains all cylinders h0(SA)ω of G0 with
h0 ∈ (SA)∗ because:
P
σ0,τ
♯
0
s (h0(SA)
ω) ≥ Pσ,τ
♯
s (h0  Π0)
≥ Pσ,τ
♯
s (Π0 is infinite and Π0 ∈ h0(SA)
ω)
where the first inequality can be proved by induction on the size of h0, using the
definition of σ0 and where the second inequality is by definition of . Clearly
E is stable by finite disjoint unions hence E contains all finite disjoint unions
of cylinders, which form a boolean algebra. Moreover E is clearly a monotone
class, hence according to the Monotone Class Theorem, E contains the σ-field
generated by cylinders, that is all measurable events E in G0. This completes
the proof of (34).
Second step to obtain (31) is to prove that for every strategy σ0 in G0:
P
σ0,τ
♯
0
s (f ≤ val0(s) + ǫ | s is reached infinitely often) = 1 . (35)
According to Levy’s law, (E
σ0,τ
♯
0
s [f | S0, A1, . . . , Sn])n∈N converges in probability
to f(S0A1S1 · · · ). Since f is a shift-invariant payoff function, for every n ∈ N,
E
σ0,τ
♯
0
s [f | S0, A1, . . . , Sn]
=E
σ0,τ
♯
0
s [f(SnAn+1Sn+1 · · · ) | S0, A1, . . . , Sn]
=E
σ0[S0A1···Sn],τ
♯
0 [S0A1···Sn]
Sn
[f ]
≤ val0(Sn) + ǫ ,
because τ ♯0 is ǫ-subgame-perfect. As a consequence P
σ,τ♯
s (f ≤ lim infn val0(Sn) + ǫ) =
1 hence (35).
Now we come to the end of the proof of (31). Let σ0 be a strategy in G0
such that (34) holds for every measurable event E in G0. According to (35),
P
σ0,τ
♯
s (f > val0(s) + ǫ and s is reached infinitely often) = 0. For i ∈ {0, 1} de-
note Ei and Fi the events:
Ei = {Πi is infinite and reaches s infinitely often}, (36)
Fi = Ei ∧ {f(Πi) ≤ vali(s) + ǫ}. (37)
Remark that Fi is well-defined since condition Ei implies that Πi is infinite thus
f(Πi) is well-defined in (37).
According to (35) and the definition of τ ♯,
P
σ0,τ
♯
0
s (f > val0(s) + ǫ ∧ s is reached infinitely often) = 0
and together with (34),
P
σ,τ♯
s (f(Π0) > val0(s) + ǫ and E0) = 0.
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Symmetrically, Pσ,τ
♯
s (f(Π1) > val1(s) + ǫ and E1) = 0, and this proves
P
σ,τ♯
s (F0 and F1 | E0 and E1) = 1.
Together with (D) and because f is submixing this implies
P
σ,τ♯
s (f ≤ max{val0(s), val1(s)} + ǫ | E0 and E1) = 1
and according to (C) this terminates the proof of (31).
Since equations (29), (30) and (31) hold for every strategy σ and every ǫ,
minmax(s) ≤ max{val0(s), val1(s)}. W.l.o.g. assume minmax(s) ≤ val0(s).
Then the stationary deterministic strategy σ0 optimal in G0 is a strategy in
G as well and σ0 ensures an expected income of val0(s) thus minmax(s) ≤
val0(s) ≤ maxmin(s). As a consequence, the state s has value val0(s) in the
game G and σ0 is optimal in G. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.
6 Applications
6.1 Unification of classical results
The existence of deterministic stationary optimal strategies in Markov deci-
sion processes with parity [CY90], limsup, liminf [MS96], mean-payoff [LL69,
NS03, Bie87, VTRF83] or discounted payoff functions [Sha53] is well-known.
Theorem 5.2 provides a unified proof of these five results, as a corollary of the
following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. The payoff functions flsup, flinf, fpar and fmean are shift-
invariant and submixing.
The proof of this proposition is an elementary exercise, details are provided
in [Gim07, Gim06].
Corollary 6.2. In every two-player stochastic game equipped with the parity,
limsup, liminf, mean or discounted payoff function, player 1 has a deterministic
and stationary strategy which is optimal.
Proof. Except for the discounted payoff function, this is a direct consequence of
Proposition 6.1 and Theorem 5.2. The case of the discounted payoff function can
be reduced to the case of the mean-payoff function, interpreting discount factors
as stopping probabilities as was done in the seminal paper of Shapley [Sha53].
Details can be found in [Gim07, Gim06].
Corollary 6.2 unifies and simplifies existing proofs of [CY90] for the parity
game and [MS96] for the limsup game.
The existence of deterministic and stationary optimal strategies in mean-
payoff games has attracted much attention. The first proof was given by Gilette [Gil57]
and based on a variant of Hardy and Littlewood theorem. Later on, Ligget and
Lippman found the variant to be wrong and proposed an alternative proof based
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on the existence of Blackwell optimal strategies plus a uniform boundedness re-
sult of Brown [LL69]. For one-player games, Bierth [Bie87] gave a proof using
martingales and elementary linear algebra while [VTRF83] provided a proof
based on linear programming and a modern proof can be found in [NS03] based
on a reduction to discounted games and the use analytical tools. For two-player
games, a proof based on a transfer theorem from one-player to two-player games
can be found in [Gim06, GZ09].
6.2 Variants of mean-payoff games
The positive average condition defined by (9) is a variant of mean-payoff games
which may be more suitable to model quality of service constraints or decision
makers with a loss aversion.
Albeit function fposavg is very similar to the fmean function, maximizing
the expected value of fposavg and fmean are two distinct goals. For example, a
positive average maximizer prefers seeing the sequence 1, 1, 1, . . . for sure rather
than seeing with equal probability 12 the sequences 0, 0, 0, . . . or 2, 2, 2, . . . while
a mean-value maximizer prefers the second situation to the first one.
To the best knowledge of the author, the techniques used in [Bie87, NS03,
VTRF83] cannot be used to prove positionality of these games.
Since the positive average condition is the composition of the submixing
function fmean with an increasing function it is submixing as well, hence it is
half-positional.
In mean-payoff co-Bu¨chi games, a subset of the states are called Bu¨chi states,
and the payoff of player 1 is −∞ if Bu¨chi states are visited infinitely often and
the mean-payoff value of the rewards otherwise. It is easy to check that such
a payoff mapping is shift-invariant and submixing. Notice that in the present
paper we do not explicitly handle payoff mappings that take infinite values, but
it is possible to approximate the payoff function by replacing −∞ by arbitrary
small values to prove half-positionality of mean-payoff co-Bu¨chi games.
6.3 New examples of positional payoff function
Although the generalized mean-payoff condition defined by (10) is not submixing
a variant is. Optimistic generalized mean-payoff games are defined similarly
except the winning condition is
∃i, f imean ≥ 0.
It is a basic exercise to show that this winning condition is submixing. More
generally, if f1, . . . , fn are submixing payoff mappings then max{f1, . . . , fn} is
submixing as well. Remark that optimistic generalized mean-payoff games are
half-positional but not positional, this is a simple exercise.
Other examples are provided in [Gim07, Kop09, Gim06].
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7 Comments
An anonymous reviewer proposed the following conjecture: given a payoff func-
tion f , if all one-player games equipped with f with the objective of maximizing
the expected payoff are positional, then all two-player games equipped with f
are half-positional. If it were true, then [Gim07] would imply the main theorem
of the present paper. We provide a counter-example to this conjecture.
We give a payoff function such that all one-player games equipped with it
are stationary with the objective of maximizing the expected payoff, and then
we give a two-player game equipped with the same payoff function where it is
necessary to use the memory, or to randomize in order to play optimally.
Consider the payoff function f : {a, b}∗ → {0, 1}, given as:
f(u) =
{
0 if u and pab2ab4 · · · share a common suffix
1 otherwise
,
where p is some finite word over the alphabet {a, b}. For every game, a colouring
function c : S→ {a, b, ǫ} is given.
It is fairly easy to see that on any one-player game equipped with f with the
objective of maximizing the expected payoff any stationary strategy is optimal.
Now consider the two-player game given in Fig.1.
ǫ
b
b
a
1
2
1
2
Figure 1: A two-player game counter-example
The states are labeled by the colouring function, and the circle states are
controlled by Player 1 and the sole square state is controlled by Player 2. Both
players have a single state with two actions, which are labeled by 1 and 2.
One can see that when Player 1 chooses any stationary strategy, Player 2 can
force the sequence ab2ab4ab6 · · · . But Player 1 can win the game by either
randomizing over the actions 1 and 2 or using the memory.
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Unfortunately, the submixing property is not necessary for a shift-invariant
payoff function to be half-positional. An example of a half-positional and shift-
invariant though not sub-mixing game is provided in [BBE10]: states are la-
beled by integers and player 1 wins an infinite play labeled by a0a1a2 ∈ ZN if
lim infn
∑
i≤n ai = −∞.
Conclusion
We have given a sufficient condition for a payoff function f : CN → R to be
half-positional, i.e. to guarantee the existence of a pure and stationary optimal
strategy for the maximizer in any stochastic game with perfect information and
finitely many states and actions. The existence of a sufficient and necessary
condition for half-positionality expressed by equations on f remains an open
problem.
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